

JUSTICE, GENDER, AND LOVE

LIBERAL AND COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE DOMESTIC CHURCH

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John Paul II's ongoing inquiries into the nature of the “domestic church” may turn out to be one of his most distinctive contributions to the corpus of modern church teaching. To some extent, his books, essays, apostolic exhortations, letters, and homilies can be seen as belated attempts to embellish an embarrassingly thin magisterial discourse on the vocation of marriage. However, these contributions have not only filled in a gap. They also attempt to move this topic to centre stage in theological inquiry. John Paul II argues that problem of spousal love illuminates the whole mystery of Christian love. It guides our approach to every aspect of the complex mystery of love—from the trinitarian love of God to the details of sexual ethics.

The emergence of these new theological concerns cannot be divorced from historical context. They need to be read in the light of a deep cultural crisis concerning marriage, sexual difference, and spousal relations. Until recently serious critique of marriage was largely confined to the academic forum. However in recent years, as Helga Maria Hernes argues, the complex issues surrounding family life, such as childrearing, reproductive freedom, and gender relations, have “gone public”.¹ Since relations to parents, spouse, siblings, or children, shape personal life in a myriad of intimately concrete ways, it is hardly surprising that the public scrutiny of such relations evokes controversy.

The lines of debate are complex and varied. In this essay I want to explore one recurring pattern of conflict. Modern debates tend to gravitate around two normative poles. At one pole discourse is shaped by the norms of justice, liberty, equality, and impartiality. At the other pole debates revolve around questions of shared meaning, love, complementarity, and intimacy. This conflict has roots within competing traditions of modern social philosophy that structure the way we perceive gender relations. Accounts which stress the primacy of justice and liberty underline the need to restructure spousal relations in an egalitarian way. The first systematic presentation of this position is found in Mary Wollstonecraft's book, *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792).² Wollstonecraft underscored the feminist implications of our commitments to liberal principles of liberty and equality. Her manifesto established a feminist voice within the liberal tradition of discourse. By the mid-nineteenth century a leading spokesman of the liberal tradition, John Stuart Mill, was acknowledging the need for such a feminist articulation if liberal social theory was to be internally consistent.³ There are other varieties of feminism which have embedded themselves within other traditions of social discourse.⁴ However, “liberal” feminism, or “mainstream feminism,” continues to play a dominant role in defining current debates.⁵

Accounts which stress the primacy of love and shared meaning argue that the marriage constitutes a unique form of life that cannot be measured by standards applicable to political community. This intimate interface community embodies a set of distinctive values and relationships that would be disrupted by the imposition of claims for self-determination and equal consideration. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a founding father of this “communitarian” line of social theory. His celebration of intimacy, gender difference and domestic bliss fed into a tradition of Romantic literature that continues to shape attitudes towards gender and marriage in popular culture.⁶ Wollstonecraft highlighted the importance of Rousseau's contribution and put forward a careful analysis and critique of his core arguments. Feminist intellectual historians cite Rousseau's influence as the source of deep-seated anti-feminist perspectives within Western culture. Reading Rousseau is, in Lynda Lange's words, an exercise in “knowing the enemy.”⁷

Both of these traditions have generated insights that have powerful claims upon us. However, these concerns for liberty or love, equality or complementarity, autonomy or intimacy, particularity or impartiality, seem to be working at cross purposes. This results in competing and apparently irreconcilable approaches to gender, marriage and family. Current contributions in moral theology and church teaching cannot be adequately assessed apart from some understanding of our context of debate. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the debate has been fruitful in generating new questions and concerns for any modern discourse on marriage. Theological analysis, whether radical or conservative, is unhelpful if it frames the agenda in such a way as to effectively beg the thorny issues posed by either liberal and communitarian accounts of marriage. Secondly, any theological or exegetical account of marriage runs the risk of

baptizing a particular agenda if it fails to offer a critical scrutiny of the intellectual history of modern debates. Historical perspective helps to clarify the loaded nature of the conceptual tools used in theological debate. Third, an effective theology of marriage must engage in the task of dialectics. Lonergan argues that theology should be able to “bring to light”, engage and overcome “fundamental conflicts” and dilemmas.⁸ Some conflicts, Lonergan notes, can be more apparent than real. However, current debates over sexual difference, love, and marriage have generated conflicts that are deep and fundamental. They raise painful and often personal dilemmas. Luce Irigaray contends that each age has “one issue to think through, and one only.” She maintains that questions revolving around the problem of “sexual difference” are “the issue” of our age and, accordingly, “the issue in our time which could be our ‘salvation’ if we thought it through.”⁹

LIBERTY, GENDER, AND MARRIAGE: THE WOLLSTONECRAFTIANS

Liberal feminist and communitarian traditions sink their roots deep into the Western traditions of social theory. Prior to Wollstonecraft the most radical statement of the implications of justice for gender relations is found in Book V of Plato’s Republic. Liberal feminists trace their philosophic roots to this ancient treatise. The Republic is concerned about the requirements for the creation of a just political order. For Plato such a society must be thoroughly public, transparent and ordered according to universal standards. Ordinary private life is suspect. The private (idion) is a dense shadowy realm filled with strong passions, personal loves and loyalties.¹⁰ It is also “messy”—governed by conflicting personal interests and opinions (doxa) that elude and corrupt the requirements of “rational self-sufficiency.”¹¹ Furthermore, this “reproductive” domain (bearing children, nurturing, meeting basic needs, alleviating suffering) represents a low order of human achievement. Plato devalues the skills, virtues and work associated with this sphere. The Republic advocates the total dismantling of the private realm—the abolition of family and the parent-child relation. A set of revolutionary practices replace the family—temporary marriages, free sex, the establishment of public child care centres, birth control, abortion, and infanticide. Gender relations are thoroughly re-organized on basis of justice. Gender is not a determinant of role or social function. The Republic contends that there is no particular role “which belongs to a woman because she is a woman, or to a man because he is a man.”¹² Women have access to all social, economic, military, and political roles. A just order will maximize each person’s ability, regardless of gender, to fulfil their productive potential in society.

Whitehead described Western philosophy as a series of footnotes to Plato. However, this tradition has treated Plato’s arguments for gender equality with contempt. Susan Okin and Christine Pierce point out that standard studies of Plato by George Grube, Ernest Barker and Alfred Taylor, dismiss Plato’s arguments about gender as flawed and impractical. Leo Strauss and Alan Bloom have tried to defend Plato by arguing that he forwarded these proposals as “comedy” or “parody” rather than serious philosophy.¹³ Wollstonecraft’s contribution provides a footnote that takes the feminist agenda of Book V seriously. Liberal feminism retrieves and develops Plato’s argument that gender relations in family and society need to be analyzed and reformed in the light of rational standards universally applicable to all persons male or female.¹⁴

However, Mary Wollstonecraft’s decisive intervention for gender justice was not the product of dispassionate Socratic reflection. It was woven out of a personal life marked by the kind of suffering paradigmatic for feminist experience—“most of the struggles of an eventful life have been occasioned by the oppressed state of my sex: we reason deeply when we forcibly feel.”¹⁵ Her childhood was a troubled one. A domineering irresponsible father was complemented by a submissive mother who doted over her sons. In her early teens Mary became her mother’s protector and “would often throw herself between the despot and his victim, with the purpose to receive upon her own person the blows that might be directed against her mother.”¹⁶ As a single woman she struggled to support herself, her siblings and her aging father. Convinced that her sister was abused by her husband, she abducted her and broke up their marriage. Her deepest friendship was found with another woman, Fanny Blood, whom she loved “better than life itself.”¹⁷ They planned to live and work together. However, Fanny eventually left Mary, seeking to improve her impoverished situation through marriage. While she was still single Mary decided to begin her own family by adopting a young girl named Anne. In her mid-thirties she went to France to see and experience the revolution. In France she met and fell in love with an American businessman, Gilbert Imlay. Imlay fathered Wollstonecraft’s first daughter, Fanny, and then abandoned both mother and child. After a suicide attempt, Wollstonecraft gradually reconstructed her life. Her final relationship with William Godwin, a radical political philosopher, was happy but short-lived. They married when Wollstonecraft became pregnant, but they decided to live separately in order to preserve their independence. At thirty-eight she died of complications following the birth of their daughter, Mary.¹⁸

Wollstonecraft’s response to adversity was not one of patient endurance.¹⁹ She exemplified the liberationist axiom the experience of oppression can generate unique insight into structures of injustice. Wollstonecraft underlined the

educative importance of adversity for women. The mind is “opened and strengthened by adversity.” She finds that happy women are often intellectually and morally “cramped.” Such women “grovel contentedly”, their vision narrowly focused on the pursuit of “present happiness,” without any desire to struggle “for the prize of her high calling.”²⁰ Wollstonecraft values domestic trials and conflict as a means by which women can be shaken out of complacent attitudes to their dependency and subjection.²¹

A Vindication of the Rights of Women was written on the heels of her defense of the French Revolution, A Vindication of the Rights of Men.²² Her treatise on the rights of women turns from a defense of the Revolution to an assault on its inconsistencies and biases. Wollstonecraft attacks the failure of the Revolution to assert “the rights of woman.” Her treatise “loudly demands justice for one-half of the human race.”²³ The Vindication attempts to expose a set of “prevailing opinions” which consistently subvert feminist articulations of liberal values.

First, Wollstonecraft argues that liberals have drawn too sharp a distinction between the public and private spheres. The public sphere, the realm of politics and the marketplace, is carefully fenced off from the private sphere, the realm of domestic life. Each sphere is perceived to operate according to its own distinct principles. She argues that liberal arguments betray a deep inconsistency if they continue to support the subjugation of women in family life while arguing for political emancipation. Arguments attempting to justify a mild despotism in the home on the basis of its overall utility for family life only mimic conservative arguments for enlightened political despotism.

Consider . . . whether, when men contend for their freedom, and to be allowed to be judged for themselves respecting their own happiness, it be not inconsistent and unjust to subjugate women, even though you firmly believe that you are acting in the manner best calculated to promote their happiness? . . . In this style argue tyrants of every denomination, from the weak king to the weak father of a family; they are all eager to crush reason, yet always assert that they usurp its throne only to be useful. Do you not act a similar part when you force all women, by denying them civil and political rights, to remain immured in their families groping in the dark?²⁴ Wollstonecraft rejects this Lockean separation of private and public. “The personal is political”—it is a realm in which power relations are operative. Accordingly the private realm needs critique and restructuring according to liberal principles of equality, liberty, and justice.

Secondly, Wollstonecraft dismisses appeals to “love” as the constitutive norm for spousal relations. Love should not override the claims of justice. However, these claims are often evaded by “prevailing” accounts which stress the primacy of eros in spousal relations. Women are socialized to perceive themselves as objects of love and this profoundly marks their self-identity:

the understanding of the sex has been so bubbled by this specious homage, that the civilized women of the present century, with a few exceptions, are only anxious to inspire love, when they ought to cherish a nobler ambition, and by their abilities and virtues exact respect.²⁵

Women should be anxious to “exact respect” rather than “inspire love.” Respect is exacted by individuals who are free, autonomous and self-sufficient. Social relations, no matter how intimate, must not sacrifice this “nobler ambition.” Accordingly, love is a passion that can be subjected to critique in the light of these weightier moral claims. Love may tend to “insulate” women from other virtues. It is typically construed in such a way that it undermines liberty, “the mother of virtue.” For women, love and liberty can make uneasy bedfellows.

Love, in their bosoms, taking place of every nobler passion, their sole ambition is to be fair, to raise emotion instead of inspiring respect; and this ignoble desire, like the servility in absolute monarchies, destroys all strength of character. Liberty is the mother of virtue, and if women be, by their very constitution, slaves, and not allowed to breathe the sharp invigorating air of freedom, they must ever languish like exotics, and be reckoned beautiful flaws in nature.²⁶

Wollstonecraft targets a critical tension in the liberal understanding of marriage and family. A sense of mutual need and dependence are basic elements in modern accounts of love. However, the presentation of marriage and family in such terms runs flat out against other deeply held values in modern culture. Self-determination and self-sufficiency must be enhanced rather than restricted by our social relations. Self-determination may be defined in Kantian terms as rational autonomy or as a utilitarian pursuit of self-fulfilment. Wollstonecraft sides with the more rigorous Kantians.²⁷ Our emotional or passionate needs must be controlled, even “contracted,” for the sake of moral autonomy.

Independence I have long considered as the grand blessing of life, the basis of every virtue; and independence I will ever secure by contracting my wants, though I were to live on a barren heath.²⁸

This drive for individual autonomy must raise suspicions about any discourse which exalts spousal love as a unique form of “mutual dependence.” Susan Okin notes that “few people disagree” with the concept that marital love involves some form of “mutual vulnerability and dependence,” nevertheless, she finds such definitions deeply problematic. Patterns of vulnerability are typically “asymmetric” and entail structures of injustice. Okin argues that marital relationships must be reformed so as to ensure that women are “fully protected against such vulnerability.”²⁹ Marriage must be “contracted” in such a way that the relationship promotes self-sufficiency and creates the conditions for exit without significant damage

to either spouse. Okin maintains that a fundamental test of justice and equality within any marriage is the “potential for satisfactory exit” from that relationship.³⁰

Finally, Wollstonecraft argues for the need to de-genderize spousal relations. She maintains that “the most holy band of society is friendship.”³¹ Friendship is based upon a genuine equality between the partners. It is grounded upon shared values and a sense of common humanity. Wollstonecraft argues that spousal relationships need to be reconstructed as an egalitarian form of friendship rather than a dependency relation of gendered love. Accordingly, she repudiates the romantic “attentions” and “ceremonies” which celebrate women “as women”. “From every quarter,” Wollstonecraft writes, “have I heard exclamations against masculine women.”³² This accusation, she argues, is due to the fact that prism of gender defines women so completely that their status as rational moral agents is obscured. Moral and educational philosophies begin by “considering females rather as women than human creatures.”³³ In a just society rational personhood must be the overriding concern. Gender differences merit no more serious consideration than do differences in hair colour. Theories of gender complementarity are challenged.

I here throw down my gauntlet, and deny the existence of sexual virtues, . . . For man and woman, truth, if I understand the meaning of the word, must be the same . . . Women, I allow, may have different duties to fulfil; but they are human duties, and the principles that should regulate the discharge of them, I sturdily maintain, must be the same.³⁴

She argues that virtues essential to our humanity—reason, fortitude, self-control—have been mislabeled as “masculine” traits. However, they are “more properly speaking” human virtues, “the exercise of which ennoble the human character.” Women are encouraged to cultivate “elegance,” “finesse” and “manners”, but not virtue.³⁵ When women “with a philosophic eye” perceive this deception they must “wish with me, that they may every day grow more and more masculine.”³⁶ However, the pursuit of the so-called “masculine” virtues of autonomy, independence and self-governance is not aimed at competition with men or “power over men.” It represents a more fundamental moral quest for self-possession, for “power . . . over themselves.”³⁷

Wollstonecraft dismisses the concept of intrinsic gender roles, as well as the notion of gender traits or virtues. She dreams of a gender-free society: “A wild wish has just flown from my heart to my head, and I will not stifle it, though it may excite a horse-laugh. I do earnestly wish to see the distinction of sex confounded in society . . .”³⁸ Gender concepts of “masculine” and “feminine” are social constructs that need to be dismantled. Susan Okin argues this critique of the notion of gender is central to liberal feminism.

No assumptions would be made about “male” and “female” roles; childbearing would be so conceptually separated from child rearing and other family responsibilities that it would be cause for surprise, and no little concern, if men and women were not equally responsible for domestic life or if children were to spend much more time with one parent than the other. It would be a future in which men and women participated in more or less equal numbers in every sphere of life, . . . “³⁹

Wollstonecraft challenges the prevailing opinion that women are primary care givers in the home.⁴⁰ However, the Vindication does betray some equivocation on this issue. Wollstonecraft occasionally appeals to a concept of motherhood as “vocation” rather than “social role.” Contemporary feminists have cited this aspect as a problematic feature which limits the relevance of her contribution to current debates.⁴¹ However, her emphasis on the ideal of “rational motherhood” is a qualified one: “though I consider women in the common walks of life are called to fulfil the duties of wives and mothers,” nevertheless she notes that “I cannot help lamenting that women of a superior cast have not a road open by which they can pursue more extensive plans of usefulness and independence.”⁴² Wollstonecraft underscores the restrictive character of the domestic sphere. It does not allow for the full expression of human potential and self-determination. Therefore, whether “married or single,” women “must have a civil existence”—they must be “independent women,” with careers in medicine, law, agriculture, business, or politics.⁴³ Spousal relations should be construed in such a way that women have meaningful access to and participation in the productive as well as the reproductive spheres of society. In contemporary liberal feminism this concern expresses itself in a critique of the dichotomy that exists between women’s and men’s opportunity to maximize career potential.⁴⁴ There must be a flat playing field: equal responsibilities for the nurturing of children and domestic chores at the private level and equal opportunities for full participation in the public sphere.

For a considerable time Wollstonecraft’s arguments for a strict gender justice were tolerated as bohemian and eccentric, or dismissed as symptoms of psychological abnormality. At best she was treated as a curiosity. The days of dismissive interpretations of Wollstonecraft’s argument for equality in gender relations are now past.⁴⁵ She framed her moral and political claims for women in such a way that they present as powerful a challenge to our view of social relations in the private sphere as well as the public sphere. Korsmeyer maintains that Wollstonecraft’s work is marked by a depth and consistency that surpasses any work produced by major nineteenth-century feminists.⁴⁶ Her argument reaches back to Plato in her celebration of reason and her insistence on the need to reform social and political life on the basis of universal rational standards. It also engages formative traditions of modern social and political thought.⁴⁷ The

refrains of Wollstonecraft's main lines of argument continue to resound in the contributions of contemporary liberal feminists to debates over the women, society and the family.

However, the passion and complexity of her classic raise questions that transcend and challenge the tradition itself. There is a theological slant in her work that sits uneasily with the this-worldly utilitarian bent of liberal social theory. Utilitarian functionalist theories are an anathema to her since they fail to target the "high calling" that is the telos of every man and woman. Wollstonecraft complains that we view "education in a false light; not considering it as the first step to form a being advancing gradually towards perfection; but only as a preparation for life."⁴⁸ Her vision of perfection is a theological one—love of God is "the supreme good."⁴⁹ This theological critique of theories which collapse moral aspiration into secular ends and the stress on the priority of theocentric goals suggests a moral theory which breaks out of the strict limits of classical liberal accounts. Perhaps, it is a sign of the stature of her text that, in the last analysis, it cannot be collapsed neatly into the liberal feminist discourse that she shaped so profoundly.

LOVE, GENDER, AND MARRIAGE: THE ROUSSEAUANS

No other modern author did more to provoke the writing of the *Vindication* than Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is fitting that at the origins of modern conflicts between liberal feminist and communitarian traditions we find these two giants crossing swords. Rousseau's earliest writings on the question of gender reflect the feminist leanings of the radical French Enlightenment philosophers. His essays during the 1730s echo arguments put forward in Baron d'Holbach's *Système sociale* and Helvetius's *De l'Homme et de l'éducation* that significant gender differences are the product of environment and education rather than nature.⁵⁰ However, Rousseau's mature writings abandon this position as he attempts to forge a new account of the nature and role of women and the family in democratic societies.

If Mary Wollstonecraft's personal life is paradigmatic for a feminist argument, a case can be made that Rousseau's early experiences are paradigmatic for an anti-feminist argument. His mother died at his birth and his father could "never forget" the fact that Jean-Jacques had been "the innocent cause of his misfortune."⁵¹ His early childhood relationship with his governess, Miss Lambercier, was marked by a mixture of physical beatings and affection. The experience was "entirely new" and "extremely dreadful; . . . and what is still more unaccountable, this punishment increased my affection for the person who had inflicted it." This combination of power, passion, pain, sensuality, and shame inflicted by a woman "has ever maintained an empire over me which has given law to my heart." Rousseau states that it shaped "my propensities, my desires, my passions, for the rest of my life, and that in quite a contrary sense from what might naturally have been expected."⁵² He would "transform" every attractive woman "into so many Miss Lamberciers." Even into his adult years "this odd taste still continued and drove me nearly to depravity and madness. . . . To fall at the feet of an imperious mistress, obey her mandates, or implore pardon, were for me the most exquisite enjoyments."⁵³ This sense of the power of women in the domain of the passions was reinforced in his early adolescence when he was sexually exploited by older women such as Miss Vulson and Goton. Rousseau's formative encounters with women were a "odd" combination of love, servile dependence and lack of autonomy.⁵⁴ His mature experiences tended to reverse this pattern of exploitation. He used and abused his young and devoted mistress, Thérèse Levasseur, abandoned their five children to foundling homes, and solicited sexual favours from a child.⁵⁵ His complex exploration of sexual love and spousal relations has to be read in the light of an equally complex personal life which he candidly reveals to his readers.

Rousseau's approach to gender questions is often conflated with older Aristotelian accounts.⁵⁶ Aristotle argued that women are by nature inferior and subject to men. For Aristotle women function best in the private domain—rearing children, feeding, clothing, and nursing. Their place in the domestic sphere is an appropriate fit since the private realm deals with a lower order of human concerns. The domestic sphere meets base human needs whereas the public realm aims at a higher order of human goods such as intellectual achievement, statesmanship, military heroism, or artistic excellence.

Rousseau does embrace Aristotle's distinction between different spheres of communal life. In this regard Rousseau's work feeds into a modern "communitarian" tradition of social theory which reaches back to Aristotle through Rousseau and Hegel and forward to contemporary theorists such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel and Jean Elshtain. While contemporary scholars would be very critical of the "patriarchal" spin Rousseau gives to communitarian theory, nevertheless they would sympathize with Rousseau's critique of attempts to collapse the boundaries between public and private. The "public economy," Rousseau insists, must be "rightly distinguished from private economy."⁵⁷

Even if there were as close an analogy as many authors maintain between the State and the family, it would not follow that the rules of conduct proper for one of these societies would also be proper for the other. They differ too much in extent to be regulated in the same manner; and there will always be a great difference between domestic government, . . . and civil government.⁵⁸

Rousseau sees a number of distinctive features in domestic community.⁵⁹ First, the intimate, interface, long-term nature

of familial relations contrasts sharply with the relatively impersonal and transient nature of our public relations. Secondly, in the public sphere there is fundamental equality before the law. In familial community there are intrinsic structures of inequality and authority such as the parent/child relationship. Third, relations in the private sphere lack the transparent institutional character of our public relations. Family life is constituted by a web of affections, feelings, attitudes of love and trust, that are dense and opaque. The emotive and affective life of the private sphere cannot be subjected to the kind of rational analysis that is appropriate to the scrutiny of public institutional patterns. Finally, in domestic life there is a unique community of interest that exceeds anything found in the public sphere. The concern for rights and autonomy is blurred in the private realm. Spouses share a community of property and in their children they share in a uniquely common good. These distinctive characteristics underscore the fact that political standards of justice are largely inapplicable to the family. Family life and political order operate “in such different ways, and their duty and rights are so essentially distinct, that we cannot confound them without forming very false ideas about the fundamental laws of society, and falling into errors which are fatal to mankind.”⁶⁰

Rousseau would have excited little interest if his discussion of gender, family and society was a mere re-statement of classical Aristotelian patriarchalism. He does take up the tradition—but he transforms it. He breaks with Aristotle by offering a far more enriched concept of the private. Rousseau’s account is based upon an acute sense of the depth and complexity of the realm of sexuality and the unique power of women in this sphere. For Aristotle the private reproductive sphere is flat, brute and functional. It does not merit serious intellectual attention. For Rousseau this sphere is rich, dark and dangerous. It is filled with powerful depth symbols and meanings that permanently mark human identity and shape social life.⁶¹ It can cripple or enrich human existence. Rousseau’s work helped to stimulate the modern exploration of the foundational significance of sexual love. He initiates a Freudian-like exploration of the formative and deformative power of erotic passion for self-identity and social relations.

Rousseau argues that the capacity for significant erotic relations awakens in adolescence. It is a “critical moment” in human development which has “far-reaching consequences.”⁶² Eros has crucial significance for the development of social relations; however, it can become distorted. Rousseau distinguishes between amour de soi, a healthy (natural) concern for one’s happiness and well-being that is the basis for balanced social relations, and amour propre, an obsessive self-centeredness that poisons social relations. Left unattended eros will become dangerous tool of “amour propre.” Amour propre will turn inwards leading to a narcissistic deformation human character and relations—“the most vicious of men is he who isolates himself the most, who most concentrates his heart in himself.”⁶³ One of Rousseau’s earliest works was a play entitled Narcisse. It is a story of about Valère, a vain and effeminate young man who is about to be married. To mock his vanity Valère’s sister gives him a portrait of himself dressed as a woman. However, Valère misses the point of the jest and falls in love with the picture. He abandons his plans to marry his fiancée, Angelique, and sets out to find the woman in the portrait.⁶⁴ Valère faces the fundamental challenge for the modern self—to turn sexual passion inwards in a fruitless search for self-sufficient gratification or to seek a more other-regarding social fulfillment. Rousseau’s critique of the essentially narcissistic character of the modern quest for autonomy is still a feature of communitarian theory.⁶⁵

Unlike Freud, Rousseau does not see an ineluctable polarization between eros and virtue, sexual desire and community. However, eros can only be morally grounded and socially cultivated in the private sphere.⁶⁶ In the family eros is “domesticated”, educated and transformed into spousal love. Spousal love, l’amour véritable, is a social construct which channels eros into constructive forms of intimacy and community. Spousal love is eros educated and civilized.

this sentiment is not so natural as men think, . . . there is a great difference between the gentle habit, which binds a man with cords of love to his helpmate [spouse], and the unbridled passion which is intoxicated by the fancied charms of an object which he no longer sees in its true light. . . . vanity demands all and gives nothing, so that it is always harmful, while love, bestowing as much as it demands, is in itself a sentiment full of equity.⁶⁷

Rousseau argues that the bond of love between men and women is very fragile. “Love does not spring from nature, far from it; it is the curb and law of her desires.”⁶⁸ Spousal love is a social construct, a language, held together by a delicate texture of “reason, prejudice and habit.”⁶⁹ Its fragility is reflected in the fact that it can easily be subverted and destroyed.

Education for love in the private sphere is radically different from the goal of education for the public sphere. In the private sphere men and women must be formed for deep mutual dependency, not independence and autonomy. Spousal love and felicity are forged in the experience of mutual need.

if each of us had no need of others, we should hardly think of associating with them. . . . I do not understand how one who has need of nothing could love anything, nor do I understand how he who loves nothing can be happy.⁷⁰

Allan Bloom, an incurable Rousseauian, writes that “Love is neediness, longing, awareness of incompleteness. . . . The lover knows . . . that he cannot live well, or perhaps at all, alone. He knows that he is not self-sufficient.”⁷¹ In order to

become lovers men and women must be educated for “incompleteness.” Rousseau wants “to educate them for each other and with each other.”⁷² Education must reinforce differentiation between the sexes in order to sharpen their sense of mutual dependence. Only on the basis of this co-dependency can the deep bonding necessary for familial life take place.

The social relation of the sexes is a wonderful thing. This relation produces a moral person of which woman is the eye and man the hand, but the two are so dependent on one another that the man teaches the woman what to see, while she teaches him what to do.⁷³

If men and women strive to be “mutually independent,” then the possibility of a deeper form of “mutual harmony” evaporates.⁷⁴

Rousseau argues that the family is one of the few domains in modern culture where an experience of organic communal relation with others can be achieved. In modern civil society we are all essentially strangers to each other with no “common purpose” that is constitutive for our lives. This ethos of self-sufficiency can define spousal relations. This is reflected in the liberal feminist insistence on autonomy and “potential for satisfactory exit” as defining characteristics of a just spousal relation. Rousseau argues such an ethos sets in motion a self-fulfilling dynamic of mutual alienation: “Each sets up his own little system; and both engrossed by the time they will no longer be together, stay only reluctantly.”⁷⁵ Bloom offers a telling commentary on this passage:

The possibility of separation is already the fact of separation, inasmuch as people today must plan to be whole and self-sufficient, and cannot risk interdependence. Imagination compels everyone to look forward to the day of separation in order to see how he will do. The energies people should use in the common enterprise are exhausted in preparation for independence.⁷⁶

This vision of the family as an organic relation of loving mutual dependence is bound up with a heavy-handed theory of gender complementarity. Gender difference is celebrated at every level. It is the central constitutive element in their spousal relations. The crucial thing that Emile and Sophie bring to their marriage is their distinctive masculinity or femininity:

I cannot repeat too often that I am not dealing with prodigies. Emile is no prodigy, neither is Sophie. He is a man and she is a woman; this is all they have to boast of. In the present confusion of the sexes it is almost a miracle to belong to one’s own sex.⁷⁷

However, Rousseau does part company with Aristotle’s fairly flatfooted concept of gender difference and complementarity. Aristotle’s theory is based on a denigration of women. Rousseau’s views are based upon a Romantic exaltation of the “feminine”. For Rousseau women exercise a unique power in the domain of eros. Woman is an analogue of Christ embodying in her person and her conduct the spirit and power of love. She is driven by “a consuming desire for love.”⁷⁸ She “reigns” over “the sweet laws of love,” and “this power cannot be taken away from woman; it is hers by right.”⁷⁹ In his *Letter to M. d’Alembert* he writes that, “Love is the realm of women. It is they who necessarily give the law in it.”⁸⁰ When Emile’s education for masculine freedom and independence in the public sphere is completed his tutor turns him over to his future wife for his education in the private sphere: “my lengthy task is now ended, and another with undertake this duty. Today I abdicate the authority which you gave me; henceforward Sophie is your guardian.”⁸¹ Male governance in the public sphere is complemented by female authority in the domain of intimacy.

However, this entails an exclusion of women from the public sphere as well as the establishment of the husband as the overall head and representative of the family in its relations with the public world. The reasons for this division are twofold. In the first place, Rousseau argues that women should be educated to “a withdrawn and domestic life” because “the peaceful care of the family and the home are their lot.”⁸² Sophie’s “power” is to be “exercised solely in conjugal union.”⁸³ Her task is an arduous and crucial one. The political functions of family life are delegated to the husband in order that she can fully attend to her mission. The woman’s “labour of love” is indispensable to the formation of a “united family.” Every aspect of familial intimacy is in her care. Rousseau argues that even the “bond between father and child” is created by her. Paternal love itself becomes a social construct forged by the woman.⁸⁴ The survival of family life in modern culture is dependent on the response of women—“Let women once again be mothers, and men will soon become fathers and husbands again.”⁸⁵ The centrality of women to the life of the family provides the reason why strict Rousseauians like Bloom are so hostile to liberal feminism. Its pedagogy disenchant the private sphere. It denigrates the language of love supportive of an ethos of mutual dependence and re-envisages spousal relations as “power relationships.” For Rousseau women make or break the private sphere. If deflected from their architectonic vocation in this sphere and encouraged to see their fulfilment in the public world, the result is predictable - the collapse of family life.⁸⁶

Rousseau argues that there is another difficulty with the presence of women in the public sphere. Their power over the erotic, the domain of love, will control and deform public life. This problematic lies at the heart of his critique of modern theatre. Its concentration on romance turns love and sexuality into a “public interest” giving “new energy and new colouring to this dangerous passion.”⁸⁷ He states that the “natural

effect” of extending “the empire of the fair sex” is “to make women and girls the preceptors of the public, and to give them the same power over the audience that they have over their lovers.”⁸⁸ Feminine power over the passionate domain penetrates into the public arena. Fashion, show, gallantry, sexual competitiveness, come to dominate social relations. There is a subtle transference whereby love absorbs the language of virtue and presents itself as the moral end displacing all other duties. Manly republican virtues are sabotaged while the effeminate arts which celebrate pleasure, luxury and erotic attraction move to centre stage. The stoic virtues critical to genuine political action and discourse are marginalized and even ridiculed.⁸⁹

The unique stage for man is the public sphere. The vocation of the male citizen involves an ascetical Kantian devotion to justice.⁹⁰ Cladif notes that Rousseau’s communitarian account of the private realm is reined in when he turns to an analysis of the public realm. Rousseau repudiates utilitarian accounts of political order which stressed the importance of meeting individual interests and cultivating happiness. The penetration of private interests into the public realm corrupts political life and generates patterns of oppression and inequality. In the public sphere one must pursue the common good and abide by rules of justice which over-ride all utilitarian concerns. This entails the existence of citizens who are capable of making self-effacing moral decisions. The exercise of public duty must not be tainted by self-interested concerns for personal happiness.

But Rousseau breaks Kant by insisting that the need for personal happiness must be fulfilled, not postponed for some future reward in the afterlife. However, this personal fulfilment is found in the realm of the private not the public: “If there is happiness upon the earth, it is necessary to discover it in the sanctuary (*l’asile*) where one lives.”⁹¹ Conjugal life provides a unique form of social life that is critical to the realization of human happiness. It is an essential base for a healthy democratic society since if such needs are suppressed they will break into and deform the public realm. Rousseau repudiates Plato’s proposals to abolish family. The needs of the private passionate sphere must be met if the stoic demands of authentic political participation are to be engaged. The family also serves as the “base” for an emotive connection to the wider community. It is “by means of the small fatherland which is the family that the heart attaches itself to the large one.”⁹² The family cultivates habits of the heart, habits of rootedness, love and affection, that cannot be found in the public realm.

The first developments of the heart were the effect of a new situation that brought Husbands and Wives, Fathers and Children together in a common dwelling; the habit of living together gave rise to the sweetest sentiments known to man, conjugal love and Paternal love.⁹³

These delicate habits of the heart cannot be nurtured in a social environment that imposes a flat juridical equality upon its members. The unencumbered self of the public realm must shed its particularity. But family life is “thick with particularity.”⁹⁴ It responds to and structured by those features of human life that do not receive recognition in the public sphere—gender difference, age, personality, personal traits, etc.⁹⁵ The private realm provides the communal context for a richer, more concrete, articulation of self-identity.

CONCLUSION

Cardinal Newman maintains that “Controversy, at least in this age, does not lie between the hosts of heaven, Michael and his Angels on the one side, and the powers of evil on the other; but it is a sort of night battle, where each fights for himself, and friend and foe stand together.”⁹⁶ To some extent, it might be argued that the lines of debate over the family are still quite sharply defined. Rousseauians like Alan Bloom are hard-nosed critics of the core principles of liberalism and their feminist ramifications.⁹⁷ Bloom sets himself up as a defender of chivalry, eros, and beauty against the hordes of Amazonian feminists who are ravaging the vestiges of intellectual and moral culture supportive of meaningful gender relations. Wollstonecraftians like Susan Okin see Rousseau as a sleazy modern adaptation of a patriarchal beast whose roots go deep into a misogynist prehistory. With the appearance of “Bloom’s 1987 version” of the “same argument” liberal feminists have a warm specimen of communitarian anti-feminism to dissect.⁹⁸ Both Rousseau and Bloom expose those basic elements of modern patriarchal ideology—the celebration of gender difference, family and love—that have become the target of sustained feminist critique.

However, as the debate evolves Newman’s theory of modern controversy begins to make sense. The “grumpy guru from Chicago” offers a dated species of communitarianism. Less loaded and more relevant forms of communitarian theory have been forwarded by philosophers such as Taylor, MacIntyre, Sandel, and Walzer.⁹⁹ The contributions of ethicists and sociologists such as Stanley Hauerwas, Robert Bellah and Christopher Lasch also feed into this developing tradition of discourse.¹⁰⁰ One can even find feminist trajectories within communitarian social theory developed in the work of authors such as Jean Bethke Elshtain and Jane Rolland Martin.¹⁰¹ Jean Elshtain insists that feminist theory needs to address a number of “thorny questions” raised by Rousseau. First, she questions feminist efforts to read family relationships through the lens of political categories. The private realm of domestic life provides a unique space for

human development. The “erosion of any distinction between the personal and the political” is wrong-headed and dangerous.¹⁰² Secondly, she is critical of rationalistic definitions of personhood which give “relatively short shrift” to the concrete male/female aspects of our corporal identity.¹⁰³ Women are liberated at the expense of significant damage to their sexual identity. Woman is dis-embodied so that a male persona may be assumed.¹⁰⁴ Third, communitarian feminists are willing to entertain complementarity. Rousseau’s rigid definition of complementarity is repudiated. Martin argues that it actually subverts the grounds for the shared life he seeks. The education of Emile and Sophie creates two truncated human beings incapable of meaningful participation in each other’s sphere of life.¹⁰⁵ However, Okin’s vision of a “just future . . . without gender” is based on a philosophical anthropology that is far too thin and abstract.¹⁰⁶ The concept that sex makes no difference is just as flawed as the belief that the sex is the difference. Fourth, Elshtain is critical of the flat-footed depiction of human practices as “roles” which are interchangeable and to a large extent extrinsic to personal identity. She emphasizes the fundamental importance of the motherhood as a “vocation”—“a complicated, rich, ambivalent, vexing, joyous activity.” To treat motherhood as “a `role’ like any other” is “to distort the full meaning of mothering.”¹⁰⁷ Fifth, she insists that children, with their complex needs for nurturing and long-term bonding, need to be affirmed as central concerns in any feminist discourse on the family.¹⁰⁸ Finally, Elshtain argues that familial ties are central to “the creation and nourishment of our humanity.”¹⁰⁹ Family is the bedrock for those particular long-term bonds, personal histories and loyalties that are constitutive for self-identity.

Elshtain maintains that the insights generated by communitarian theory do not entail the “tedious” patriarchalist conclusions advanced by Rousseau.¹¹⁰ Liberal feminists are not convinced. They suspect that such proposals entail the subversion of feminist theory, not its revision. Judith Stacey probes communitarian feminism in her essay “Are Feminists Afraid to Leave Home?”¹¹¹ Stacey wonders whether communitarian concerns for intimacy and long-term relationships can be squared with liberal concerns for equality and self-determination.¹¹² Particular loyalties seem to violate the open non-discriminate respect we owe to all moral agents. They must be bracketed out if we are to judge such relationships in the light of publicly transparent standards that embody the norms of equal consideration, opportunity, and self-determination.¹¹³

Susan Okin introduces her discussion of gender and family with a critique of moderate communitarians such as Sandel, Taylor, MacIntyre, and Walzer.¹¹⁴ She argues that the communitarian attack on liberal commitments to rational detachment and universality represents a celebration of particularity, contextuality and tradition that may obscure and legitimate patterns of domination and inequality. Appealing to Mill she insists that “the principle of perfect equality” must regulate all “existing social relations between the sexes.”¹¹⁵ Those features particular to my life—my sexual identity, my upbringing, my age, my race, my religion—are accidental in light of the overriding moral concerns for liberty and equal consideration. “A just future,” Okin writes, “would be one without gender, . . . one’s sex would have no more relevance than one’s eye colour or the length of one’s toes.”¹¹⁶ If capacities for free choice and contract are crucial features of my identity as a moral agent, then, as Okin argues, it is “essential to take a frank look at the institution of marriage in liberal society, and to destroy the mythical notion of it as a realm to which contractual thinking is inappropriate.”¹¹⁷ The “unencumbered self” expresses itself in an unencumbered spousal relation.

Can these conflicting accounts be resolved? Robert Paul Wolff offers a poignant response in his essay “There’s Nobody Here But Us Persons”.¹¹⁸ Wolff argues that the conflict between these two visions of gender relations and the family “is rooted in two equally plausible and totally incompatible conceptions of human nature”.¹¹⁹ Wolff’s difficulty is that he cannot in good conscience dismiss the claims or critiques of either tradition. On the one hand, he shares liberal concerns for fundamental rights, self-determination and equal opportunity. On the other hand, he sympathizes with communitarian intuitions into the contextual character of human life. “Briefly, I find myself committed to two totally different conceptions of human beings, and as a consequence two opposed principles of social justice and public policy.”¹²⁰ For Wolff the external polarizations of debate speak to inner conflicts. His doubts and uncertainties in the face of these debates express the complexities and tensions of modern self-identity. It is unlikely that “there’s nobody here but Wolff” struggling with such inner conflicts.

Perhaps this equivocation points in the right direction. Newman argues that theoretical accounts of reality are abstract takes which are inherently incomplete. When a particular account is “ridden too hard,” then the range of academic discourse becomes cramped. Competing theories are suppressed and “one-sided,” “radically false,” views of reality emerge.¹²¹ But intellectual comprehensiveness is a rare achievement. Seyla Benhabib’s study, *Situating the Self*, offers a valiant attempt at comprehensiveness. However, there are still winners and losers in her dialectical juxtaposition of liberal and communitarian values. Benhabib maintains that, the final analysis, liberal concerns for impartiality and justice must “trump” communitarian concerns for care and intimacy.¹²²

Benhabib’s failure to break through this impasse may be connected to the fact that she joins a large chorus protesting against any “univocal conception of the human good.”¹²³ Yet, this protest, so pervasive in the modern academy, disguises a subtle, but profound, closure of debate. Newman warns that modern debates are typically framed in such a way that theological traditions of inquiry, inquiries into the “supreme good”, are sidelined. Furthermore, he

maintains that theological perspective is crucial in overcoming “one-sided” treatments of basic moral questions.¹²⁴ Can theology probe the issues generated by the liberal/communitarian conflict in a way that it enriches, rather than skews, current debates?¹²⁵

There are a number of lines of theological inquiry and critique that can be pursued. First, the thinness of liberal feminist theories of love needs interrogation. Are arguments to displace the primacy of love by justice fully aware of what is being displaced? Is my true dignity as a human person more fully responded to by an act of love or one of respect? Is there not something about human fallibility and vulnerability that is overlooked in the celebration of justice? Is marriage more adequately understood as a contractual agreement which safeguards individual autonomy or as a covenantal agreement which sacrifices autonomy for the sake of the other? The communitarian definition of love as mutual need and dependence also raises serious concerns. Is the highest of human virtues rooted in a subtle greed which needs the other for the sake of personal fulfilment? Is not love devalued when it is severed from freedom and reason and grounded in passion and need? Could love be seen as the most profoundly free act—an act of self-giving to another, an act rooted in our rational will not just in our needs and inclinations? Finally, isn't it odd that love, the deepest expression of human community, is construed in such a way that it is excluded from the public realm?

Secondly, there are questions about the nature of human freedom. Such questioning would have to probe the liberal feminist view that freedom, i.e. self-sufficiency and autonomy, is the goal of human community. Is freedom, in the last analysis, an end or is it a means to a higher good? Perhaps, the fundamental expression of human freedom is the choice to love or to refuse to love? Is the goal of rational self-sufficiency or autonomy ultimately a refusal to ever give oneself fully to another person? However, the muddiness of the communitarian emphasis on the situated character of human liberty is also disturbing. It is true that our liberty is not absolute and that we are situated by our history, our language, our culture, our embodied identity.¹²⁶ Yet, could such an emphasis spell a failure of moral nerve? Could it obscure our ultimate responsibility for situating our own freedom—that some of the most profoundly freedom-situating events of our lives are bound up with our own life-determining choices, our vocations, our commitments to love and nail down our lives for others?

Working through this conflict demands openness and receptivity to the competing claims put forward by these influential traditions of social inquiry. These traditions intermingle and interweave within our thinking and acting in very complex ways. John Paul II's theology of spousal love reflects these tensions. His emphasis on mutual subjection and his firm repudiation of patterns of domination and subordination in marriage proves troublesome for conservative Catholics who have canonized a Rousseauian reading of gender relations. On the other hand, his celebration of “complementarity,” his discourse on the vocation to love, and his insistence on the indispensable place of parental love, especially maternal, for human development, raises suspicions for those committed to a Wollstonecraftian vision of liberation. Liberals and communitarians have cultivated rich fields of discourse that help define and redefine our relations as men and women. Their intellectual chaff does need winnowing. But winnowing is for the sake of harvesting. To winnow hard, incessantly and one-sidedly, may damage the harvest that a contemporary theology of marriage is called to reap.

¹. Helga Maria Hernes, Welfare State and Woman Power. Essays in State Feminism (London: Norwegian University Press, 1987).

². Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (London: Penguin, 1992).

³. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869) in Essays on Sex Equality by J. S. Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill, ed. by A. S. Rossi (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

⁴. See Rosemarie Tong's overview in Feminist Thought (Boulder/ San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989). Contemporary feminist philosophers continue to engage developments in liberal theory and explore their application to the family.

⁵. Zillah R. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (New York: Longman, 1981) 4. Susan Moller Okin figures prominently in current debates between liberals and communitarians on questions of gender. Her contribution to the development of liberal feminist theory is shaped by the work of John Rawls. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989) and Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

⁶. Alan Bloom discusses Rousseau's impact on nineteenth-century literature in Love and Friendship (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1992)

⁷. Lynda Lange, “Rousseau and Modern Feminism,” in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, edited by Mary Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) 109.

⁸. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, (New York: Seabury, 1979) 235.

⁹. Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, translated by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell

University Press, 1993) 5.

¹⁰ Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Woman in Social and Political Thought, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 22-23.

¹¹ Jean Elshtain, "The Family and Civic Life," in Power Trips and Other Journeys: Essays in Feminism as Civic Discourse (University of Wisconsin, 1990) 47. Martha Nussbaum maintains that for Plato, "Our ordinary humanity is a source of confusion rather than of insight." The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 135. Society must be a rationally integrated community and the disruptive factionalism of the private sphere must be eliminated. Republic 141, 144.

¹² Socrates argues that being male or female is comparable to being or not being bald, The Republic of Plato, trans. Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968) 132, 134.

¹³ Susan Okin, Women in Western Political Thought 34-35, 305-308; Christine Pierce, "Equality: Republic V." Monist 57 (1973) 1-11.

¹⁴ Women in Western Political Thought 220, 303.

¹⁵ Quoted from "'The Oppressed State of My Sex': Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Equality," by Moira Gatens, in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, edited by Mary Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) 112.

¹⁶ William Godwin, Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (Oxford: Woodstock Books, 1990) 9-10.

¹⁷ Eleanor Flexner, Mary Wollstonecraft: A Biography (Baltimore: Penguin, 1973) 26-27.

¹⁸ Godwin edited and published her unfinished works and memoirs. Their daughter, Mary Shelley, was the author of Frankenstein.

¹⁹ "The being who patiently endures injustice, and silently bears insults, will soon become unjust, or unable to discern right from wrong." Vindication 180.

²⁰ Vindication 144, 114-116, 151.

²¹ Vindication 114.

²² Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, facsimile reproduction, (Gainesville, Fla., 1960). The book is a hard-hitting rebuttal of Burke's critique of the Revolution.

²³ Vindication 89.

²⁴ Vindication 87.

²⁵ Vindication 79.

²⁶ Vindication 121-22.

²⁷ Liberals equivocate somewhat in their definition of freedom. See Rosemarie Tong's discussion in Feminist Thought 11, 15.

²⁸ Vindication 85.

²⁹ See chapter seven, "Vulnerability by Marriage," in Justice, Gender, and the Family 134-169, esp. 138, 169. Wollstonecraft notes this asymmetry—women are "educated for dependence" while men are educated for independence. Vindication 135.

³⁰ Justice, Gender, and the Family 167-68.

³¹ Vindication 138, 113.

³² Vindication 80.

³³ Vindication 79.

³⁴ Vindication 139.

³⁵ Vindication 80, 82, 86, 106.

³⁶ Vindication 80.

³⁷ Vindication 154.

³⁸ Vindication 147.

³⁹ Justice, Gender, and the Family 171

⁴⁰ Flexner, Mary Wollstonecraft 135.

⁴¹ See Zillah R. Eisenstein, "Mary Wollstonecraft: The Feminist Embrace and Criticism of Liberalism," in The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism 89-112.

⁴² Vindication 259.

⁴³ See Wollstonecraft's discussion "Of the Pernicious Effects which Arise from the Unnatural Distinctions Established in Society," Vindication 252-63, esp. 261-62.

⁴⁴ Vindication 135; Susan Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 156. There are hints of a Platonic devaluation of skills and tasks associated with the reproductive sphere of social life. Okin refers to domestic work as "boring and/or unpleasant" (150). This devaluation of the reproductive sphere is critiqued by Jean Elshtain, Public Man and Private Woman ch.6 and by Jane Roland Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1985) chs. 1 & 2.

- ⁴⁵. Eleanor Flexner states that in hindsight we can see that few texts have exerted “as powerful an influence as the Vindication has done.” Mary Wollstonecraft 11.
- ⁴⁶. Carolyn W. Korsmeyer, “Reason and Morals in the Early Feminist Movement,” in Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation (New York: G. O. Putnam’s Sons, 1976) 97-111.
- ⁴⁷. G. J. Barker-Benfield illuminating study explores Wollstonecraft’s roots in the English civic humanist tradition, “Mary Wollstonecraft: Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthwoman,” Journal of the History of Ideas 50 (1989) 95-115. However, her links to radical dissent and her translations of texts from the German and French Enlightenment suggest a more complex engagement with eighteenth-century traditions of social theory.
- ⁴⁸. Vindication 142-43.
- ⁴⁹. “Let love of man be only a part of that glowing flame of universal love, which, after encircling humanity, mounts in graceful incense to God.” Vindication 160.
- ⁵⁰. See Okin’s discussion of their contribution in Women in Western Political Thought 103-04.
- ⁵¹. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. W. Conyngham Mallory, (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1928) 7.
- ⁵². Confessions 19-20.
- ⁵³. Confessions 21-22.
- ⁵⁴. Judith Shklar discusses Rousseau’s ambivalent attitudes to authority, submission and freedom in “Images of Authority,” in Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) 127-164.
- ⁵⁵. Helen Evans Misenheimer, Rousseau on the Education of Women (Washington: University Press of America, 1981) 4-5.
- ⁵⁶. Okin describes Rousseau as an “exaggerated” and “hysterical” representative of the “whole Western tradition regarding women”, a tradition which “reaches back to Aristotle and beyond.” “Rousseau argues all the most commonly held assertions that have, as part of our patriarchal culture, rationalized the separation and oppression of women throughout the history of the Western world.” Women in Western Political Thought 99
- ⁵⁷. “A Discourse on Political Economy,” in The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. by G. D. H. Cole, (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1958) 235.
- ⁵⁸. “A Discourse On Political Economy,” 233.
- ⁵⁹. “A Discourse on Political Economy,” 233-34.
- ⁶⁰. “A Discourse on Political Economy,” 235.
- ⁶¹. “Among the passions . . . there is . . . a terrible [one] which . . . in its fury, seems fitted to destroy the human race it is destined to preserve.” Second Discourse quoted from Joel Schwartz’s The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 39.
- ⁶². Jean-Jacques Rousseau Emile, or Education, trans. by P. D. Jimack (London: J. M. Dent, 1974) 172-176. Jimack’s translation of Emile is used unless otherwise indicated. Adolescence represents one major stage in Rousseau’s theory of psychological development—“As the roaring of the waves precedes the tempest, so the murmur of rising passions announces this tumultuous change” (172). See Bloom’s discussion in Love and Friendship 54-57.
- ⁶³. Politics and the Arts: Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert, trans. Alan Bloom, (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960) 117.
- ⁶⁴. See Schwartz’s discussion, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 70-73.
- ⁶⁵. See Christopher Lasch’s influential study, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: Norton, 1978). A more carefully nuanced discussion is provided by Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Concord: Anansi Press, 1992), chs. 5-7.
- ⁶⁶. Letter to M. d’Alembert 117.
- ⁶⁷. Emile 564.
- ⁶⁸. Emile 175.
- ⁶⁹. Emile 175.
- ⁷⁰. Emile 182.
- ⁷¹. Love and Friendship 547.
- ⁷². Emile 368. Rousseau’s complex novel about marriage and romance, La Nouvelle Héloïse, explores this pattern of mutual need in its portrait of the spousal relation between Julie and Wolmar. La Nouvelle Héloïse, trans. Judith H. McDowell, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968) esp. 259-63.
- ⁷³. Emile 340.
- ⁷⁴. Emile 340.
- ⁷⁵. Emile 53.
- ⁷⁶. Closing of the American Mind 117.
- ⁷⁷. Emile 356.
- ⁷⁸. Emile 323, 360.
- ⁷⁹. Emile 324.

- ⁸⁰. Letter to M. d'Alembert 47. Julie's lover, Saint-Preux, speaks of his total submission to her "supreme will." La Nouvelle Héloïse 52. See Shklar's discussion of this pattern of submission in "Images of Authority" 136-139.
- ⁸¹. Emile 444.
- ⁸². Letter to M. d'Alembert 82.
- ⁸³. Quoted from Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 41. "Men and women are made to love one another and to unite; but beyond this legitimate union all amorous relations between them prove a dreadful source of disorders in society and in morals." "Discourse on the Sciences and Arts," in The First and Second Discourses trans. Victor Gourevitch, (New York: Harper and Row, 1986) 68.
- ⁸⁴. Emile 324. See Lynda Lange, "Rousseau and Modern Feminism," in Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, 100. A variant of this argument is found in John Paul II's discussion of how men learn self-sacrificial paternal love through the example of maternal love, Mulieris Dignitatem #18.
- ⁸⁵. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. by Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979) 11-12.
- ⁸⁶. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind 99-132; Love and Friendship 25-28.
- ⁸⁷. Letter to M. d'Alembert 47. When love breaks out of the realm of privacy into the public sphere it generates unmanageable forms of social conflict. "Discords triumphs, and the gentlest of the passions receives sacrifices of human blood." "Discourse on Inequality," in The First and Second Discourses 175.
- ⁸⁸. Letter to M. d'Alembert 47.
- ⁸⁹. "Love, love itself, takes on the mask of virtue in order to surprise it; . . . it usurps its force; it affects its language, and, when the error is perceived, it is far too late to recover!" Letter to M. d'Alembert 118, 51-57. Rousseau singles out Molière for criticism. In his plays age, prudence and virtue are consistently overshadowed by the charm of youth, passion and love. See Joel Schwartz's discussion, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 61-68.
- ⁹⁰. "Rousseau and Durkheim: The Relation between the Public and the Private," Journal of Religious Ethics 21 (1993) 1-25.
- ⁹¹. Emile ou de l'éducation (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966) 628 (my translation). See Stephen G. Salkever, "Rousseau and the Concept of Happiness," Polity 11 (1978) 27-45.
- ⁹². Emile, trans. Allan Bloom, 363.
- ⁹³. The First and Second Discourses, 173-74.
- ⁹⁴. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture 52.
- ⁹⁵. "Each family became a small Society, all the better united as mutual attachment and freedom were its only bonds; and that is when the first difference was established in the ways of life of the two Sexes, which until then had but one." "Discourse on Inequality," in The First and Second Discourses, 173-74.
- ⁹⁶. Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909) 201.
- ⁹⁷. Alan Bloom, "Relationships", in The Closing of the American Mind and Love and Friendship (1992); also Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986).
- ⁹⁸. Justice, Gender, and the Family 33-40.
- ⁹⁹. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 2d ed., (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), and whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), Philosophy and the Human Science: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983). See Will Kymlicka's "liberal" assessment of debates between liberals and communitarians in Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).
- ¹⁰⁰. Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), "The Family as a School for Character," Religious Education 80 (1985) 272-85; Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), "The Church as the Context for Family," New Oxford Review December (1987) 6-13; Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World (New York: Basic Books, 1977)
- ¹⁰¹. Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought, Power Trips and Other Journeys, and The Family in Political Thought, editor (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), Meditations on Modern Political Thought (New York: Praeger, 1988); Jane Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation.
- ¹⁰². Public Man, Private Woman 217-18.
- ¹⁰³. Public Man, Private Woman 240, 303. See Elshtain's review of Okin's Justice, Gender, and the Family in "Begging to Differ," Hastings Center Report Jan./Feb. (1992) 47. Alison Jaggar argues that liberal feminists are "normative dualists" in view of the relation between mind and body, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983) 28.
- ¹⁰⁴. See Elshtain's critique of Simone de Beauvoir, Public Man, Private Woman 306-310; see Jane Martin's criticisms of Wollstonecraft on this score, "Wollstonecraft's Daughters," in Reclaiming a Conversation 70-102.

- ¹⁰⁵ Jane Martin, Reclaiming a Conversation 53-69.
- ¹⁰⁶ Jean Elshtain, "Begging to Differ" 47.
- ¹⁰⁷ Public Man, Private Woman 242-43, 333-334.
- ¹⁰⁸ Public Man, Private Woman 327-333.
- ¹⁰⁹ Public Man, Private Woman 326-27.
- ¹¹⁰ The Family in Political Thought 18-19.
- ¹¹¹ Judith Stacey, "Are Feminists Afraid to Leave Home? The Challenge of Conservative Pro-family Feminism," in What is Feminism? eds. Juliet Mitchel and Ann Oakley (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 219-248.
- ¹¹² "Are Feminists Afraid to Leave Home?" 240-41.
- ¹¹³ Okin argues that developing this sense of impartiality should be a central task in the nurturing and education of children, Justice, Gender and the Family 177.
- ¹¹⁴ Justice, Gender, and the Family chs. 2 & 3.
- ¹¹⁵ The Subjugation of Women 125.
- ¹¹⁶ Justice, Gender, and the Family 171.
- ¹¹⁷ Justice, Gender, and the Family 122, 28-29.
- ¹¹⁸ Robert Paul Wolff's "There's Nobody Here But Us Persons," in Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation 128-144.
- ¹¹⁹ "There's Nobody Here But Us Persons," 137.
- ¹²⁰ "There's Nobody Here But Us Persons," 128.
- ¹²¹ J. H. Newman, The Idea of a University, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982) 71, 43-44.
- ¹²² Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992) 181-87.
- ¹²³ Situating the Self 75. Benhabib appeals to the critique of the notion of a supreme good in MacIntyre's After Virtue. However, in Whose Justice, Which Rationality? MacIntyre abandoned this position.
- ¹²⁴ His argument is examined in my essay, "God and the Academy: Newman on the Marginalization of Theology in Academic Discourse" Theological Studies 55 (1994) 3-23.
- ¹²⁵ On Newman's theology of marriage see the author's "Newman's `Lesson of the Marriage Ring'" (forthcoming).
- ¹²⁶ Public Man, Private Woman 172-73; C. Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society 154-66. Taylor's account is not vulnerable to the criticisms raised here.