Carving out a safe space for the secular

The National Post, 9 October 2021

“The Secular Road to Religious Freedom” was the title over a Robert Fulford column last January. I was reminded of it when reading a piece by John Russell in The Advocate , on the Chamberlain case, entitled “How to be Fair to Religious and Secular Ideals within the Liberal State.“ Both men endorse the thesis that (in Fulford's words) everyone will “be better able to maintain their beliefs in freedom if the political world holds no religious views” but “offers only reason, and an umbrella to shelter the diverse faiths that flourish among us.”

Mr. Russell elaborates this thesis under the rubric (borrowed from Will Kymlicka) of “liberal neutrality.” The theory of liberal neutrality goes roughly like this: The state serves as a kind of referee regulating the competition between religions, and between the religious and the non-religious. It refuses to take sides with this or that world view or way of life, but makes sure that there is some kind of space for adherents of each, so long as they play by the rules. The state makes sure that the distribution of public resources (including “the social bases of respect and dignity”) is fair. That is, it concerns itself with justice, with equality; not with the good, or with different conceptions of the good. It concerns itself strictly with means, which are public, not with ends, which are private.

Dr. Fulford's appeal to this kind of thinking was offered in support of his suggestion that Anglican primate, Michael Peers, shouldn't have complained so peevishly about the marginalization of religion in public affairs (e.g., at the 9-11 memorial). The referee, after all, should not be embracing the players. Mr. Russell's appeal was made in hopes of influencing the Supreme Court's impending decision on Chamberlain v. The Surrey School District No. 36 . Chamberlain , it seems, is right: a secular society is one in which faith in “two dads” ought to be given equal time with faith in “one dad,” even among kindergarten students.

Now it occurs to me that Mr. Russell might find an ally in Michael Peers, but I musn't get sidetracked with that. It is not the Chamberlain decision that interests me so much as the theory which both Fulford and Russell want us to buy into. Indeed I am confident that the theory most interests those two gentlemen as well. I want to offer just a couple of reasons ­– though there are many others – for mistrusting this theory.

The first is its re-definition of the role of reason. Classical thought, both Greek and Christian, would never allow that reason has any lesser goal than pursuit of the good. Nor would it allow any such dichotomy between means and ends, or between the public and the private, as this theory devises. That “liberal neutrality” rests on the assertion of such discontinuities and dichotomies marks it out as a distinct world view in its own right: as a philosophy and perchance even a theology (for philosophy always comes, sooner or later, to theology) that must be content to compete on the field, and not pretend to be a referee. One does not have to adhere to one or another of the classical world views in order to admit this. But “liberal neutrality” by definition refuses to admit it. For this pretence it ought to be ejected. Players are not allowed to play in a referee's jersey.

The second is its re-definition of the secular state as the saviour of religion. It may seem rather ungrateful, even churlish, to object to “liberal neutrality” on the grounds that it understands secular society as a society that is not essentially hostile to religion. Nevertheless, I prefer the good old-fashioned animosity of the militant secularist to this further posturing. At least the militant secularist doesn't take his stance on someone else's platform.

Once upon a time it was the Christian religion which carved out a safe space for the secular. The very concept of the secular state is in fact a Christian one. The state is “secular” because it is strictly provisional, owing to the fact that it belongs to an age ( saeculum ) that is passing away, an age that will be – and in some sense already has been­ – superseded by the kingdom of God . The secular state is a liberal state alright, but it is neither opposed to religion nor does it fancy itself the referee of religion. It is liberal because it has learned something about freedom, from the truth that makes us free. It is liberal because it is modest, and it is modest because it knows that it is temporary, not because it imagines itself to be neutral.

There is indeed a religious road to secular freedom, one from which our society has wandered. It is time to have another look at the map.

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